CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONALISM: TRUST IN GOVERNMENT
AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY
*

Stephen M. Griffin

For anyone who regards U.S. constitutionalism as synonymous
with the federal Constitution, the kind of constitutionalism practiced
in California can be disorienting. In California and other states, a
constitutional and legislative process driven by popular vote runs parallel to the familiar three branches of government. In this Article, I
provide a new perspective on the origins and persistence of “California constitutionalism,” a kind of constitutional order in which the
mechanisms of direct democracy—the initiative, referendum, and recall—are employed to supplement representative democratic institu1
tions. In California, the initiative and referendum are not merely extra avenues to put legislation on the books. They are crucially
important constitutional processes. Through these processes, California voters have repeatedly reshaped their constitutional order and af2
fected the national political agenda.
In contemporary times, direct democracy has been consistently
controversial since California voters adopted tax-cutting Proposition
3
13 in 1978. The last round of public debate occurred relatively re-
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cently, with critics such as David Broder and Peter Schrag decrying
4
what they saw as its adverse consequences for governance. Whatever
the benefits and failings of direct democracy, I suggest insufficient attention has been paid to the historical and institutional question of
how we got here in the first place. Sometimes overly hasty criticisms
of direct democracy have substituted for a more nuanced analysis of
the reality that the United States has multiple constitutional orders or
regimes, originating from different periods in its history, operating
within its borders.
Coming to terms with the origins of direct democracy depends on
understanding constitutional orders as time-bound and contingent. I
will argue that direct democracy grew out of the failure of the Framers’ eighteenth-century political institutions in the context of late
nineteenth-century politics. Direct democracy is thus less a deviation
from the Framers’ design than a creative supplement forced by fundamentally new circumstances.
My main thesis is that the origins and persistence of direct democ5
racy has to do with the problem of trust in government. Focusing on
the problem of trust establishes a new context for understanding direct democracy. Put simply, citizens are more likely to favor direct
democracy when they distrust politicians and how the government
works (or appears to work). In such circumstances, the legitimacy of
representative government comes into question and the alternative of
direct democracy appears reasonable. Once direct democracy is
adopted, it is unlikely a purely representative system can be restored
without confronting the problem of trust.
In general, trust in government (or rather, the prevalence of distrust) should be regarded as an important constitutional issue. The
frequent resort to direct democracy in California and other states
should prompt us to rethink whether the system of representative
government established by the Founding Generation is adequate to
the challenges posed by contemporary politics. Direct democracy is
in many respects the paradoxical consequence of the corrosive distrust produced by what scholars might regard as the ordinary and legitimate processes of representative government. Coming to terms
4

5

See, e.g., BRODER, supra note 2, at 51–52 (decrying the “stunted . . . growth” and “administrative nightmare” created by Proposition 13 and the subsequent growth industry devoted
to “manipulation of public opinion”); PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST: CALIFORNIA’S
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its critics. See BRODER, supra note 2, at 1–3.

Feb. 2009]

CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONALISM

553

with direct democracy means appreciating that its flaws, while quite
real and substantial, cannot be addressed without acknowledging the
serious problems citizens perceive with representative institutions. It
is likely that both require fundamental reform.
Why focus on California constitutionalism? California is, of course,
6
an important state with a distinctive and interesting history that includes frequent recourse to the processes of direct democracy. In
addition, California’s challenges, such as funding government and
coping with racial, ethnic, linguistic, and ideological diversity, tend to
7
be national challenges. The increased use of direct democracy by
the California electorate, especially the initiative, has drawn the attention of scholars, as well as severe criticism from well-informed po8
litical observers. But my reasons for focusing on California go beyond these points. California is worth considering as a “newmodeled” polity of the late nineteenth century. California’s present
constitution was adopted in 1879 and underwent a significant reordering in the progressive period. As perhaps the best known and
most studied example of progressive era constitutionalism, California’s experience can be usefully compared with the U.S. Constitution
and the constitutional experience of the Founding Generation.
9
California is such a large and extensive polity that we can glimpse
in it what the U.S. constitutional order might have looked like had it
been created through a constitutional convention early in the twentieth century. In some significant ways, California’s constitution tracks
the structure of the contemporary constitutional order far more
closely than does the U.S. Constitution. Most important, the problem
of trust in government is a national problem, one not unique to California. Studying California’s history can illuminate this ongoing concern with American government.
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This Article has three parts. In Part I, I review the history of the
origins of direct democracy in California. While the story behind the
adoption of the initiative, referendum, and recall is somewhat familiar, important institutional and constitutional questions have often
gone unaddressed. In Part II, I first review the contemporary status
of direct democracy in California in relation to the problem of trust
in government. I then present a detailed explanation of the decline
of trust in government in the United States by reviewing the most
relevant social science evidence. I argue that the problem of trust in
government is a national problem extending back to the 1960s. This
suggests that the use of direct democracy will persist until the problems citizens have with representative institutions are acknowledged
and addressed. Finally, in Part III, I offer some concluding reflections.
I. ESTABLISHING DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN CALIFORNIA
Direct democracy has been part of American government for over
10
a century. Despite this long history, it remains the subject of a con11
tentious debate. Indeed, critics often treat it as a newcomer to our
constitutional system and tend to concentrate on the question of
12
whether we should be for or against direct democracy. However, I
believe that before we can evaluate any aspect of the American constitutional order, we should have a secure understanding as to why it exists and what purpose it serves.
It is thus appropriate to begin with the original reasons direct
democracy was adopted in the early twentieth century. Its adoption
can be viewed as something of a puzzle. The conventional wisdom of
constitutional scholars is that the system of representative government adopted by the Founding Generation has stood the test of time.
If there is a policy that a clear majority of the public favors, their representatives have substantial incentives to give the people what they
want. In doing so, they will earn the public’s favor and probably be
reelected. If this system works to generally implement public opinion, the puzzle is why direct democracy exists at all. If, as many believe, the Framers of the Constitution designed a stable and well10
11
12

The main wave of state adoptions of the initiative came between 1902 and 1918. JOHN J.
DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 94 (2006).
ALLSWANG, supra note 1, at 4.
See, e.g., BRODER, supra note 2, at 1 (“The initiative process, an import now just over one
hundred years old, threatens to challenge or even subvert the American system of government in the next few decades.”).
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13

ordered representative government, how did direct democracy
come about?
To answer this question, we should briefly consider the standard
14
story of how direct democracy was adopted in California. After the
“Big Four” of Leland Stanford, Collis P. Huntington, Charles
15
Crocker, and Mark Hopkins created the Central Pacific and built
the transcontinental railroad, its successor, the Southern Pacific,
16
achieved a monopoly over rail transportation in California and came
to dominate its politics. The railroad sought to control the political
system in much the same way as it sought to dominate the state’s
transportation network. It corrupted politicians, political parties, in17
deed the entire political system. Certain public-spirited citizens who
did not owe their livelihood to the railroad eventually reacted against
this corruption and sponsored the Lincoln-Roosevelt League, the po18
litical arm of the progressive movement in California. They contested for power and won control of state government. Led by Governor Hiram Johnson, they enacted various reforms, including the
19
initiative, referendum, and recall in 1911.
The standard story about the origins of direct democracy suggests
strongly that the citizens of California had lost confidence in the
normal workings of representative democracy. Accounts of the origins of direct democracy often say that its advocates believed their po20
litical system was corrupt. Were they right? If they were, how did
this occur and what does it tell us about the system of government
bequeathed to California by our constitutional tradition?
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See, e.g., Mathew D. McCubbins, Putting the State Back into State Government: The Constitution
and the Budget, in CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA: MAKING STATE GOVERNMENT
MORE EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIVE 353, 354 (Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll eds., 1995)
[hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA] (blaming reform initiatives starting in the Progressive Era for limiting the effectiveness of California’s government).
For a useful account, see Karl Manheim & Edward P. Howard, A Structural Theory of the
Initiative Power in California, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1165, 1174–90 (1998). See also Nathaniel
A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the Initiative, Referendum and Recall
Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL’Y REV. 11 (1997) (providing further explanations of the origin of ballot initiatives in Western states).
On the “Big Four,” see JAMES J. RAWLS & WALTON BEAN, CALIFORNIA: AN INTERPRETIVE
HISTORY 171–73 (2003).
Id. at 180–84.
See id. at 231–40.
Id. at 260–64.
SCHRAG, supra note 4, at 189–90.
E.g., ALLSWANG, supra note 1, at 5; BRODER, supra note 2, at 26.
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In previous work, I have argued that towards the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century the
United States confronted the need to expand and modernize the na21
tional administrative state. In the early stages of this adjustment,
there was a fundamental mismatch between the rudimentary and
nonprogrammatic institutions of government at the federal level and
the rapidly developing industrial economy, the growth of large-scale
business organizations, and an increasingly urbanized and ethnically
22
pluralistic society.
This mismatch strongly influenced the subsequent development of the national state and derived from two gaps
between constitutional powers and institutional means. Specifically,
the Constitution had created a relatively weak national state with uncertain powers of enforcement and a limited administrative capacity.
Increasingly, Congress had to deal with complex, ongoing regulatory issues that could not be solved through the distribution of bene23
fits. However, Congress found itself unable to resolve these issues
through the legislative process. Political parties and elections could
not help because they were not oriented toward national policymaking. There was thus a gap between the public authority the electoral
process provided and the kind of public authority the elected
branches needed to deal with these new issues. Consequently, there
was a move away from vesting public authority in the “democratic
24
party-legislative process.”
The establishment of direct democracy in California is a good example of the consequences of the mismatch at the state level between
governing institutions and a rapidly modernizing economy. In state
constitutions adopted in 1849 and extensively revised in 1879, Californians followed the model of the U.S. Constitution and created a
25
constitutional order with multiple and competing power centers.
However, this pluralistic constitutional arrangement was not supported by a plurality of power centers in the economy and society. In
21
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24
25

STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS 79–80
(1996) (citing STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION
OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920, at 10–18 (1982)).
See generally ALAN DAWLEY, STRUGGLES FOR JUSTICE: SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
LIBERAL STATE (1991) (approaching historical conflicts and consensus through an examination of contradictions in social order, structure, and governance).
GRIFFIN, supra note 21, at 79 (“The mismatch between private power and public authority
led to a kind of breakdown in the constitutional order.”).
Id.
See CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. III–VI (establishing a government with three separate, coequal branches). The current constitution, adopted in 1879, maintains the same general
structure. See generally CAL. CONST. (maintaining the same structure).
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the nineteenth century, California had only a few power centers, with
26
the Southern Pacific overwhelmingly dominant. The Southern Pacific sought predictability from the political system in order to recoup
its enormous investment in the railroad. It also sought political support for its effort to expand and indeed monopolize California’s
27
transportation network. California thus entered the Union precipitously and without the political maturity that characterized the
American colonies in 1776. This observation may strike some as odd,
but historians will remind us that the colonies had experienced well
over a century of continuous social, economic, political, and legal de28
velopment on the eve of the Revolutionary War.
California sought admission into the Union only one year after
the Gold Rush began and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was
29
signed, ending the war with Mexico. Gold had been discovered at
Sutter’s Mill just nine days earlier, but the signers were unaware of
30
this event. The Treaty was ratified in May 1848 and news reached
31
California in August. Military government continued out of neces32
sity, as Congress could not agree on a territorial government. As a
consequence, California would skip the territorial stage of govern33
ment entirely.
Prior to the Gold Rush, California’s non-Indian population was
34
less than 15,000. The sudden massive influx caused by gold fever resulted in a population of 223,856 in 1852. For 1860 the regular census figure was 380,000, and for 1870 more than 560,000, almost all of
35
them men. These new immigrants did not come to California with
the idea of living there permanently. As stated by historians Rawls
and Bean:
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GEORGE E. MOWRY, THE CALIFORNIA PROGRESSIVES 9–22 (1951); SPENCER C. OLIN, JR.,
CALIFORNIA’S PRODIGAL SONS: HIRAM JOHNSON AND THE PROGRESSIVES, 1911–1917, at 1–3
(1968); KEVIN STARR, INVENTING THE DREAM: CALIFORNIA THROUGH THE PROGRESSIVE
ERA 199–207 (1985).
See WILLIAM DEVERELL, RAILROAD CROSSING: CALIFORNIANS AND THE RAILROAD, 1850–
1910, at 27–29 (1994) (detailing the expansionary goals of the “Big Four” railroad companies).
For a historical overview, see generally AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER:
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1978).
RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 15, at 95.
Id.
Id. at 117.
Id.
Id. at 117–18.
Id. at 111.
Id.
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The great majority of them came in the hope that they could quickly
plunder California of its treasure and return to their homes. . . . Most of
those who remained in California did so because they failed to accumulate even enough to get them back home. On the whole they were un36
successful, disillusioned, embittered men.

As historian John Burns remarks, “most gold seekers did not view
California as a permanent destination and had little interest in civic
37
affairs.”
California’s first constitutional convention occurred in September
1849. Most of the new constitution was not original, as the delegates
38
followed the examples of Iowa and New York. The deliberations of
the convention showed how difficult it was to maintain the distinction
between fundamental principles, which properly belong in a constitu39
tion, and legislative matters. California was then admitted into the
Union as part of the Compromise of 1850, in which it was recognized
as a free state, but the territories of Utah and New Mexico could be
40
organized without any ban against slavery.
What sort of “state” was it? As Burns states, “It was a lightly occupied, vast area that gained worldwide attention with unprecedented
speed. . . . Public and governmental operations were virtually non41
existent.” The state’s political authorities, such as they were, strug42
gled to provide a legal order for a small and transitory population.
Nineteenth-century American government has been described as a
43
state of “courts and parties,” but in California, even these institutions did not exist at this early stage.
One of the most important legacies of the Constitution of 1849
that is relevant to the establishment of direct democracy was its limitation on the number of representatives in both houses of the state
legislature. As modified by the 1879 Constitution, the California Assembly may have no more than eighty members and the California
36
37

38
39

40
41
42
43

Id. at 112.
John F. Burns, Taming the Elephant: An Introduction to California’s Statehood and Constitutional Era, in TAMING THE ELEPHANT: POLITICS, GOVERNMENT, AND LAW IN PIONEER
CALIFORNIA 1, 5 (John F. Burns & Richard J. Orsi eds., 2003) [hereinafter TAMING THE
ELEPHANT].
See RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 15, at 121.
See Gordon Morris Bakken, The Courts, the Legal Profession, and the Development of Law in
Early California, in TAMING THE ELEPHANT, supra note 37, at 74, 77 (relating various statements by the delegates concerning both immediate and abstract concerns associated with
the formation of a government).
RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 15, at 122–23.
Burns, supra note 37, at 4.
Id. at 4–6.
SKOWRONEK, supra note 21, at 24.
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44

Senate no more than forty. The consequence today is that the most
populous state has enormously large legislative districts, in all likelihood making it more difficult for members of the legislature to represent their constituents effectively. As Peter Schrag noted in 1998,
“California’s senate districts, each with a population of some 800,000
residents, are larger than its fifty-two congressional districts, making it
unlikely that many voters will have any direct contact with their repre45
sentatives.”
Focusing on the adequacy of the system of representation is important, because it is precisely this aspect of the California constitutional order that was targeted as inadequate by the advocates of direct
democracy. Californians had acquired a poor opinion of their state
46
legislature by the 1870s. As Judson Grenier notes, “‘[c]onflict of in47
terest’ was not a commonplace concept” in the legislature. He continues, “That first political factions and then special business interests
compromised the integrity of the state legislature was recognized by
most nineteenth-century historians and contributed to the public dis48
affection that led to the second constitutional convention.”
The 1879 convention was dominated by a split between the Workingmen’s party led by Dennis Kearney and everyone else, both Re49
publicans and Democrats. In the judgment of historians Rawls and
Bean the constitution was not a success: “In place of an imitative,
short, and concise document, it produced one that was much more
original, extraordinarily long, and extremely detailed. Yet California’s second constitutional convention achieved remarkably little net
improvement over the first, and virtually every hope of effective re50
form was ultimately disappointed.”
Why was the new constitution so much longer than the old? Historian Carl Swisher pointed to the low opinion in which the state legislature was held by delegates. “[T]he delegates looked upon themselves as more truly the representatives of ‘the people’ than any
subsequently chosen legislators, and thought it their duty to include a
large amount of important legislation in the constitution, where it

44
45
46

47
48
49
50

Burns, supra note 37, at 10.
SCHRAG, supra note 4, at 201.
See Judson A. Grenier, “Officialdom”: California State Government, 1849–1879, in TAMING
THE ELEPHANT, supra note 37, at 137 (explaining that Californians were disillusioned by
the excesses of government officials for years prior to the 1879 convention).
Id. at 145.
Id. at 147.
See RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 15, at 196.
Id. at 197.

560

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 11:3

51

would not be easily subject to change.” The “delegates regarded the
52
legislature as a necessary evil, and an expensive one at that.” He
comments: “If the delegates had come to the convention determined
to cinch capital, tax mortgages, and expel the Chinese, they were also
determined to put the legislature in its place. Session after session
charges of incompetence and corruption had been made against the
53
legislature, not always without reason.”
At the same time, at least in Swisher’s judgment, delegates did not
54
free themselves from the sort of motives that drove state legislators.
The sorry record of the convention indicates that the delegates did
not have a good understanding of the problems facing the state or
sound ideas about possible solutions. One of the reasons the 1787
Federal Convention was successful was that the delegates had extensive experience with American state and national government. They
also had thought about possible solutions and discussed those before
the convention began. By contrast, prior to the California convention, “there was little intelligent consideration given to the question
of what might be legitimately expected to be achieved by revision of
55
the fundamental law of the state.” Swisher concludes with respect to
the convention’s impact:
The constitution was intended to be a piece of fundamental legislation
which would of itself immediately reorganize and redirect the political
life of the state. Instead, in the light of a retrospect of fifty years, it seems
to have been only one skirmish in a series of battles that have raged dur56
ing and since the decade of the seventies.

The Constitution of 1879 failed to achieve any of its goals. It did not
result in effective railroad regulation, tax relief for farmers, help for
57
workers, or (thankfully) exclusion of the Chinese. However, it re58
mains California’s foundational law.

51
52
53
54

55
56
57
58

CARL BRENT SWISHER, MOTIVATION AND POLITICAL TECHNIQUE IN THE CALIFORNIA
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1878–79, at 65 (Da Capo Press 1969) (1930).
Id. at 96.
Id.
See id. at 85 (“Throughout the discussion of all the diverse provisions of taxation it was
strikingly evident that the delegates were not seeking to discover or to apply any fundamental principles of public finance. They were concerned primarily with shifting from
themselves and their constituents as much as possible of the burden of taxation. The motive, throughout, was economic self interest . . . .”).
Id. at 18.
Id. at 114.
See Burns, supra note 37, at 13 (noting that “the new constitution did little” to advance the
drafters’ initial interests).
See id. at 16 (explaining how, in spite of numerous amendments, the 1879 Constitution
affects modern California).
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Most important for our story, the new constitution did not improve the reputation of the state legislature. By the 1880s, criticism
of the legislature for abuse of the patronage system and the use of
special legislation that benefited particular lobbyists and businessmen
59
was common. State legislators were not well paid and this made
them easy prey for well financed lobbyists.
Members of the Founding Generation might have been able to
diagnose what was wrong with the Californian political system. By
traditional republican standards, California lacked the kind of political economy necessary to support representative government. Civic
republicans such as Thomas Jefferson believed that good government
60
flowed from the ready availability of land.
Widespread freehold
ownership would guarantee the existence of a republican political
order. Yet in California, land ownership was concentrated and citi61
zens complained of a land monopoly. A middle class of yeoman
farmers never developed. From an eighteenth century point of view,
the prospects were never good that republican government would
62
function as well on the Pacific coast as it did on the Atlantic.
The operations of the Southern Pacific made the attainment of
republican government even more difficult. Historian Kevin Starr
writes that the railroad “offered the most obvious instance of what
was grossly wrong with California: a very few of the super-rich virtually owned the state—its land, its economy, its government—and were
63
running it as a private preserve.” In 1883, hundreds of letters between Collis Huntington and associate David Colton dating from
1874 to 1878 were made public in the course of a lawsuit. “The bulk
of these letters dealt with the delicate matter of bribing Washington

59

See DONALD J. PISANI, FROM THE FAMILY FARM TO AGRIBUSINESS: THE IRRIGATION CRUSADE
1850–1931, at 21–24 (1984) (listing examples of patronage
positions and press denunciations of the patronage system).
See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY
IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776–1970, at 30–34 (1997) (describing property rights as
a foundational aspect of Jeffersonian civic republicanism); DREW R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE
REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA 186 (1980) (listing “an unobstructed access to an ample supply of open land” as central to Jefferson’s conception of a
sustainable political economy).
PISANI, supra note 59, at 11–15; see also OLIN, supra note 26, at 27–28 (illustrating the vehement public outcry over land monopoly).
In his important historical study, Thomas Goebel argues that “[t]he vision that inspired
many direct democracy reformers was a distinctly economic one, that of a republic of
small independent producers freely competing in an unfettered marketplace.” GOEBEL,
supra note 3, at 5.
STARR, supra note 26, at 199.
IN CALIFORNIA AND THE WEST,
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congressmen and Sacramento legislators to favor pro-railroad legisla64
tion.”
During the legislative session that began in January 1907, the citizens of the state were informed by the press that “no important action was taken in either house without the sanction of [the] three top
65
members of the Southern Pacific’s legislative directorate.” Kevin
Starr comments, “[t]he last four years of the [Southern Pacific]’s
control over California were the most flagrant. Certainly the legislature of 1907 set new records for influence-peddling and outright
66
bribery.” The progressive editor of the Fresno Republican concluded
that “[t]he state had lost . . . the things for which the Revolutionary
and Civil wars were fought. Unless California arose and overthrew
corrupt corporation government as Wisconsin had done, then its
67
peoples were not fit for self-government.” California was ready for
68
change.
The elite group of progressives that met after this sorry legislative
performance to form the Lincoln-Roosevelt League were in favor of
many specific reforms such as “the direct primary, the initiative, referendum, and recall, the regulation of utility rates, conservation of
forests, the outlawing of race-track gambling, a workmen’s compensation law, woman suffrage, a blue-sky law, and a minimum-wage law for
69
women.” But the first plank in their platform was to emancipate
“the Republican Party in California from domination by the Political
70
Bureau of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company.” From the perspective of the progressives, the entire political system was the captive
of a particularly powerful special interest, and on this point they were
indisputably correct.
Californians thus had good reason to believe that something had
gone terribly wrong with representative government. But does this
indicate a problem with the representative principle itself? Defenders of representative democracy would surely say not. We should
keep in mind, however, that the Founding Generation believed that
the maintenance of a republican constitutional order rested on a cer-

64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Id. at 202.
MOWRY, supra note 26, at 63; see also STARR, supra note 26, at 205 (discussing the high level
of Southern Pacific’s control over California).
STARR, supra note 26, at 205.
MOWRY, supra note 26, at 65.
See DEVERELL, supra note 27, at 150 (discussing the origins of the California progressive
movement).
MOWRY, supra note 26, at 70.
Id.
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tain form of political economy. If those economic conditions did not
obtain, the existence of republican government was threatened. Applying this eighteenth-century logic to California, we can infer that
constitutionalism in the Golden State was under siege from the beginning. By this logic there was too little available farmland and an
71
urban area (San Francisco) that was far too large. This analysis can
be pushed further. Eighteenth-century republican theory could not
take the measure of corporate power. According to Eldon Eisenach,
leading progressive social thinkers did not (and could not) turn to
72
the American constitutional tradition for help.
The eighteenthcentury inheritance was too meager to be of much use in new circumstances.
Whether judged by the standards of the eighteenth or early twentieth century, then, the California constitutional system came up
short. In California, the conditions for republican government did
not obtain. Further, the giant corporation had intruded into the
constitutional sphere. There was no obvious way to “check and balance” the power of the Southern Pacific by using the theories of the
Founding Generation. California progressives thus had to find their
own way.
It should be appreciated that the conclusions reached by progres73
sives in California were shared by their counterparts in other states.
As recounted by historian Thomas Goebel, there was increasing skepticism during the nineteenth century concerning the competence of
state legislatures: “Americans severely weakened state legislatures,
adopted the popular ratification of new state constitutions and
amendments, and increasingly resorted to popular referenda to de74
cide crucial issues.” Direct democracy was the next logical step as
75
corporate influence persisted over the legislative process. Historian

71

72

73

74
75

San Francisco had 23% of the total population of the state in 1890. See DEP’T OF THE
INTERIOR, TWELFTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES, TAKEN IN THE YEAR 1900, at 2, 432,
available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/33405927v1_TOC.pdf
(reporting California’s population as 1,485,053 and San Francisco’s as 342,782).
See ELDON J. EISENACH, THE LOST PROMISE OF PROGRESSIVISM 106–07 (1994) (“Constitutional law and the leading lights of American legal scholarship were treated by Progressive intellectuals with studied neglect as a kind of fossilized and symbiotic complement to
the party system, which, in turn, they treated with studied contempt.”).
For a careful review of the states that adopted direct democracy in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, see STEVEN L. PIOTT, GIVING VOTERS A VOICE: THE ORIGINS
OF THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN AMERICA (2003).
GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 14.
Id. at 115.
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Steven Piott noted the existence of a “sense of overwhelming frustra76
tion” with the existing political system:
Convinced that their elected representatives had failed to respond to
changes that affected their lives as taxpayers, citizens, workers, or farmers, and that they had allowed a disproportionate share of political power
to be held by special interests, voters concluded that the nature of politi77
cal participation would have to be redefined.

However, advocates of direct democracy generally did not reject representative government. They made clear that the devices of the
popular initiative and referendum were supplements to representa78
tive democracy, not replacements.
John Dinan has examined the general reasons behind the adoption of direct democracy in his comprehensive review of state constitutional conventions. His discussion shows that delegates believed
they had good reason to reject the reliance of Madison and the other
Founders on representative institutions. “State constitution makers
concluded, in the first place, that Madison was too sanguine about
the capacity of representative institutions to combat the problem of
79
minority faction.”
That is, state legislatures could too easily be
dominated by interest groups. Second, the structure of a representative system meant that it was too easy for office holders to feather
80
their own nests at public expense through patronage and the like.
Third, legislatures were refusing to address long-standing issues of
81
public importance. Dinan concludes: “[T]he adoption of direct
democratic institutions at the state level was not the result of instinctive and undeliberative acts, but rather was the product of longstanding concerns about deficiencies in representative institutions
and a belief that existing institutional arrangements were incapable
82
of remedying these problems.”
This account of the origins of direct democracy in California
shows that it was far from an ill-considered deviation from the constitutional tradition of representative government. It was rather a rational response forced by the repeated failure of representative government over a period of decades. This does not establish that direct
democracy was the best solution to the problems of representative

76
77
78
79
80
81
82

PIOTT, supra note 73, at 255.
Id. at 251.
GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 55.
DINAN, supra note 10, at 95.
Id.
Id. at 95–96.
Id. at 96.
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government. But it does show we need to take direct democracy seriously as a meaningful response to the breakdown of the Founders’
system of governance.
II. DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF TRUST IN GOVERNMENT
In A Theory of Justice, the great political philosopher John Rawls defined the idea of a well-ordered society as one that generates its own
83
psychological and moral support. Such a society is said by Rawls to
be stable when it is able to generate a sense of justice that is able to
84
counter tendencies toward injustice. Extending Rawls’s concept to
the political sphere, we could say that a system of representation is
stable when it is able to generate its own support over time. That is,
citizens believe the system taken on balance tends to satisfy widely accepted norms of how legislators should behave and how the legislature and executive should make policy.
The history of the origins of direct democracy recounted in Part I
supports the conclusion that California’s system of representation
failed the test of stability after only a few decades. Ultimately, the
state legislature was unable to satisfy public expectations and so generate support for the system of representation. In response, California evolved a robust alternative system of governance or constitutional order. The evolution of direct democracy in California (and
most likely elsewhere) therefore cannot be understood properly
without taking into consideration the failure of representative institutions to accomplish one of their most basic tasks.
Direct democracy may well be seriously flawed on both theoretical
and practical grounds. Yet so long as the public views the representative process as equally flawed, there is little likelihood that its popularity will diminish. This suggests that instead of devoting attention
solely to the problems with direct democracy, we should inquire into
the reasons why its de facto partner, the system of electoral representation, has proven to be so unsatisfactory. That is the focus of this
part of the Article.

83
84

JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 397–98 (rev. ed. 1999).
See id. at 398 (“Now a well-ordered society is also regulated by its public conception of
justice.”).
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A. Direct Democracy in Contemporary California
Interest in initiatives has waxed and waned in California politics,
although it has never disappeared entirely. Thomas Goebel records:
Direct democracy . . . immediately became a widely popular and extensively used part of state government. . . . During the 1910s, 30 initiatives
qualified for the ballot, 35 during the 1920s, and 36 in the 1930s. After
1940, the number of initiatives dropped sharply, to 20 in the 1940s, 12 in
the 1950s, and an all-time low of 9 in the 1960s, before the rise of new so85
cial movements launched a sharp rise after 1970.

He notes that the initiative did not seem to lead to the adoption of
86
radical laws. Rather, it became an additional instrument of interest
87
group politics. Interestingly, Goebel concludes: “Because the existence of direct democracy offered pressure groups and citizens additional means to shape the political agenda, California voters were directly confronted with options and policy alternatives not present in
88
many other states.”
Experienced observers of California politics have recognized that
the persistent use of the initiative is linked to the public’s low opinion
89
of representative government. As California journalist Peter Schrag
puts it, “During the two decades since the passage of [Proposition]
13, California has been in nearly constant revolt against representa90
tive government.” Proposition 13, the most famous initiative in U.S.
91
history, was the property tax-cutting measure that passed in 1978 by
a margin of 65%-to-35%. It was preceded by a decline in public con92
fidence in government and “set the stage for the Reagan era, and
became both fact and symbol of a radical shift in governmental priorities, public attitudes, and social relationships that is as nearly fundamental in American politics as the changes brought by the New
93
Deal.”

85
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GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 141.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 171.
For a study that links the initiative to ongoing political distrust, see BALDASSARE, supra
note 7, at 12–13, 46–53.
SCHRAG, supra note 4, at 9–10.
See Todd Donovan & Shaun Bowler, Responsive or Responsible Government?, in CITIZENS AS
LEGISLATORS, supra note 1, 249, 254.
See MARK BALDASSARE, A CALIFORNIA STATE OF MIND: THE CONFLICTED VOTER IN A
CHANGING WORLD 45–46 (2002) (“We believe that the main factor in explaining the tax
revolt is distrust in government.”).
SCHRAG, supra note 4, at 132.
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High property taxes had been a political issue in California for
94
roughly a decade prior to the passage of Proposition 13. There was
therefore no question of a sudden new issue for state legislators. In
the end, the state legislature and political leaders proved unrespon95
sive on an issue critical to voters. This “reinforced the public’s scorn
for the legislature and government in general and created a vacuum
96
that made the passage of Proposition 13 possible, even likely.” Despite years of controversy over the effects of Proposition 13, it continues to be popular and resonates with voters as a valuable limit on
97
government.
The passage of Proposition 13 created a new era for direct democracy in California. Other ballot propositions that restricted the ability
98
of state government to tax and spend followed quickly. According
to Elisabeth Gerber, “Between 1974 and 1990, California voters considered 73 statewide initiatives, of which 32 passed. These initiatives
covered policy areas as diverse as taxation, insurance regulation, government reform, gambling, environmental policy, criminal law, and
99
school funding.” Not all initiatives led in the direction of less government. Environmental initiatives were popular in the 1970s, such
as the much noted Coastal Zone Protection Act, a temporary measure
100
that was later replaced by legislation.
Here again, the perception
was that the state legislature had proved incapable of addressing an
101
important policy problem.

94
95
96
97
98

99

100
101

See ALLSWANG, supra note 1, at 102–09 (detailing the history of tax-reform initiatives and
propositions in the years immediately prior to the passage of Proposition 13).
See SCHRAG, supra note 4, at 142–45 (describing the legislative inertia on tax reform in the
face of popular political pressure).
ALLSWANG, supra note 1, at 109.
See BALDASSARE, supra note 7, at 88–91 (showing that “only one in four Californians” feel
that Proposition 13 negatively affected government services).
See ALLSWANG, supra note 1, at 109–19 (detailing efforts by anti-tax activists in the wake of
Proposition 13); Bruce E. Cain et al., Constitutional Change: Is It Too Easy to Amend Our
State Constitution?, in CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 13, at 265, 287
(linking the success of Proposition 13 with the success of subsequent tax-reform initiatives).
Elisabeth R. Gerber, Reforming the California Initiative Process: A Proposal to Increase Flexibility
and Legislative Accountability, in CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 13, at
291 (footnote omitted).
See ALLSWANG, supra note 1, at 136–37 (explaining the origins of the Coastal Zone Protection Act).
See id. at 136 (linking the Coastal Zone Protection Act’s origin to legislative failures in the
early 1970s).
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Another ballot measure that indicated dissatisfaction with the legislature was Proposition 140 in 1990, which established term limits for
legislators. “The support for Proposition 140 was a measure of widespread voter dissatisfaction with the workings of state government.
Many Californians had become convinced that the state legislature
was dominated by powerful special interests and was hopelessly out of
102
touch with the concerns of average citizens.”
Californians contin103
ued to have a low opinion of the state legislature in the 1990s.
A
number of initiatives that drew attention were the result of legislative
inaction. Reform of bilingual education was blocked in the legislature by politicians responsive to the Latino community and teachers’
104
unions.
As ballot propositions became common, politicians realized they
could use them as part of their overall strategy. Governor Pete Wilson used the initiative process to build wedge issues that would help
him get reelected (Proposition 187 on illegal immigration) and further his presidential ambitions (Proposition 209 on affirmative ac105
tion). Perhaps to Wilson’s surprise, Proposition 187 caused a backlash among Latinos, spurring many to register to vote and waking the
106
“sleeping giant” of their political power.
What of the continued use of the initiative process in the present?
What survey research shows is that like citizens in the rest of the
United States, Californians do not trust their legislature and continue
107
to approve of the mechanisms of direct democracy.
According to
political scientist Mark Baldassare, “Voters often prefer to turn to citizens’ initiatives to make public policies because of their impatience
with the speed of the legislative process and their distrust of the deci108
sions that politicians make.”

102
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RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 15, at 468.
Id. at 471.
See BRODER, supra note 2, at 169–70 (“[T]he Democrats who controlled the assembly and
state senate responded to two pressures—leaders of the Latino community . . . and the
teachers’ unions . . . .”).
RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 15, at 470–71.
Id. at 550.
BALDASSARE, supra note 92, at 121.
Id. (citation omitted). A 1998 survey showed that “Californians by a 3-to-1 margin chose
initiatives over reliance on the governor and the state legislature to pass laws.”
BALDASSARE, supra note 7, at 84–85.
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To be sure, there has been real frustration and severe criticism di109
rected against the use of the initiative in California. Tellingly, Baldassare remarks that “many elected officials and political observers
110
would like to see the initiative process just go away.” This is unlikely
111
because the initiative remains popular.
A detailed 1997 poll
showed continued support for the initiative, as “72 percent of re112
spondents said that they were a good thing for the state.” It should
be noted that even critics of the initiative admit that the state legisla113
ture has not always acted responsibly.
The use of direct democracy continues unabated. In 2005, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, himself the product of an unprece114
dented recall election, ordered a special election to allow California
voters to remake their constitutional order through the initiative
115
process.
Some observers have announced the advent of “hybrid
116
democracy” in which citizens, political parties, and politicians in the
legislative and executive branches all use both the legislative process
and the tools of direct democracy to achieve their ends. Baldassare
concludes:
The roots of this political change are found in four trends evident in recent California politics—the public’s support for a populist approach to
policy making and their basic distrust of government, along with widespread concerns about the influence of partisanship and special interests
117
on decisions made by their elected representatives.

By this point, these factors should strike us as familiar.

109

110
111
112
113
114

115
116
117

See ALLSWANG, supra note 1, at 245–49 (“Most initiative measures are ultimately decided
by a small and unrepresentative body of voters. . . . [whose] laws . . . are often badly
drawn, extreme, and subject to judicial revocation.”). See generally SCHRAG, supra note 4
(describing inadequacies and deficiencies present in California’s initiative system). For a
recent example of criticism from political science, see Thad Kousser & Mathew D.
McCubbins, Social Choice, Crypto-Initiatives, and Policymaking by Direct Democracy, 78 S. CAL.
L. REV. 949 (2005).
BALDASSARE, supra note 92, at 252.
See BRODER, supra note 2, at 208 (providing polling numbers illustrative of the popularity
of the initiative process).
ALLSWANG, supra note 1, at 236.
See SCHRAG, supra note 4, at 13, 201–06.
For discussion of the recall of Governor Gray Davis and election of Governor Schwarzenegger, see MARK BALDASSARE & CHERYL KATZ, THE COMING AGE OF DIRECT
DEMOCRACY: CALIFORNIA’S RECALL AND BEYOND (2008). For a discussion of Schwarzenegger’s strategic use of the initiative, see Elizabeth Garrett, The Promise and Perils of Hybrid Democracy, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 227 (2006).
Jordan Rau, Governor Puts Agenda on the Ballot, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 2005, at 1.
BALDASSARE & KATZ, supra note 114, at 211; see also Garrett, supra note 1.
BALDASSARE & KATZ, supra note 114, at 219.
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It is thus reasonable to ask how representative government in California got so badly off the track. Table 1 in the Appendix lists illustrative California initiatives that were approved between 1978 and
1998. What this chart suggests is that there were some extraordinarily
popular policy measures that were never taken up or acted upon by
the state legislature. How could this happen in a representative system? Some initiatives, such as one proposing to designate English as
the official language, might have related to an unusual split between
mass and elite opinion—leaders of both parties opposed this proposi118
tion, yet it was approved by an overwhelming majority. Still others,
such as those addressing term limits, had to do with governance questions on which politicians are unlikely to vote against what they perceive as their own interests.
But the overall record cautions those who take an uncritical stance
toward representative democracy. These California initiatives show
that representative government fails to represent the popular will on
some issues. This suggests that the popularity of direct democracy,
particularly the constitutional initiative in California, is as much a
story of legislative failure as it is a story of populist uprisings and interest group struggles. The largely hidden dimension of the story of
direct democracy in California is that of a state legislature chronically
unable to satisfy public expectations. That failure should concern us
just as much as the problems of direct democracy, and we should inquire into its sources.
Whatever the precise mix of reasons, it is apparent that the ongoing popularity of direct democracy in California has to do with the
failure of the state’s political institutions to “re-present” popular opinion. There are obvious similarities in this respect between California
and the national government in Washington. Both do not enjoy high
levels of public trust and trust tends to be lowest for the legislature—
the institution of government that the Framers thought was the most
representative. In what follows, I provide a detailed review of the social science evidence relevant to the decline of trust in the national
government. It turns out there is evidence that the decline is linked
to the performance of democratic institutions, especially legislatures.
This will help illuminate the debate over direct democracy.

118

ALLSWANG, supra note 1, at 182.
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B. The Decline of Trust in Government
The California experience suggests strongly that there is a link between use of direct democracy and decreased trust in government.
As Bruce Cain and Roger Noll argue, “the overriding problem in contemporary American government, whether at the local, state, or federal level, is the perception that government is unresponsive to citizens. The extensive use of the initiative in California reflects this
119
120
frustration.” Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam’s well-known study of
civic engagement and social capital, provides a general introduction
121
to the decline of political trust. “Americans in the mid-1960s were
strikingly confident in the benevolence and responsiveness of their
122
political institutions.”
But in contemporary times, the situation is
reversed. “In the 1990s roughly three in four Americans didn’t trust
123
the government to do what is right most of the time.” As Putnam
describes:
In April 1966, with the Vietnam War raging and race riots in Cleveland,
Chicago, and Atlanta, 66 percent of Americans rejected the view that the
people running the country don’t really care what happens to you. In
December 1997, in the midst of the longest period of peace and prosperity in more than two generations, 57 percent of Americans endorsed that
124
same view.

Gary Orren observes that changes in political leadership have not
125
made a difference. “For three decades, administrations have come
and gone, and polling charts have bounced up and down in response
to this leader or that policy, yet public trust has tumbled ever down126
ward, regardless of which party has been in power.” A cynicism that
has lasted this long must be “fueled by a deeper set of accumulated
grievances with political authority, institutions, and processes in gen127
eral.” Using evidence from the National Election Studies (“NES”),
119
120
121
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123
124
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Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, Introduction to CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA,
supra note 13, at 2.
ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY (2000).
Putnam’s chief concern is social trust, the trust we have in other people, not trust in government. Id. at 137. He notes that trust in government is not the same thing as social
trust. Id.
Id. at 47.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Gary Orren, Fall from Grace: The Public’s Loss of Faith in Government, in WHY PEOPLE DON’T
TRUST GOVERNMENT 77, 81 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter WHY PEOPLE
DON’T TRUST GOVERNMENT].
Id. at 78.
Id. at 79.
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Orren shows that trust in government was above 70% in the late
128
1950s and early 1960s.
“Trust fell by a full 15 percentage points
from 1964 to 1968, years of intense racial turbulence and turmoil
over Vietnam during Lyndon Johnson’s administration, and then another 8 percent in the first two years of Richard Nixon’s presi129
dency.”
Orren wonders how this could be the case given that this
130
period was one of great national and legislative accomplishment.
“Public satisfaction [with government] has improved only twice
131
since 1964 . . . .”
Once was during President Reagan’s first term
132
when he began delivering on his economic promises. The second
133
occurred in 1996, as President Clinton concluded his first term.
The economy was doing well, the deficit was reduced, and crime rates
134
dropped.
The administration pursued a policy of centrism, which
135
sat well with moderate voters.
Russell Dalton agrees with Putnam and Orren in his review of the
136
evidence.
NES surveys showed high levels of support up until the
137
He
mid-1960s, when there was a break and a precipitous decline.
attributes this to the divisive political issues of the time such as civil
138
rights, Vietnam, and Watergate. The Reagan presidency temporar139
ily reversed these trends and trust went up in 1984. But further declines occurred and by 1994, the NES surveys recorded historically
low levels of trust. At that point, “[o]nly 22 per cent of the American
public felt one could trust the government to do the right thing most
of the time, only 20 per cent believed the government is run for the
benefit of all, and only 48 per cent thought most government officials
140
were honest.”

128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140

Id. at 80.
Id.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 105.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 105–06.
Id. at 106.
See Russell J. Dalton, Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies, in CRITICAL
CITIZENS: GLOBAL SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 57 (Pippa Norris ed., 1999).
Id. at 62.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Because so many social scientists rely on them, the NES questions
are worth a closer look. The “trust battery” in the NES is composed
141
of four questions:
Trust. How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right—just about always, most of the
time, or only some of the time?
Waste. Do you think that people in government waste a lot of the
money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don’t waste very much of it?
Interest. Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few
big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of
all the people?
Crooked. Do you think that quite a few of the people running the
government are crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any
142
of them are crooked?

From a republican and constitutionalist perspective, the two most
relevant questions are those dealing with trust and interest. Whether
the federal government is best regarded as activist or limited, it will
be difficult for it to accomplish any goal, no matter how worthy, without a modicum of trust. In addition, ideally we want a republican
and democratic government to be run for the benefit of all the people, not simply a small self-interested elite.
The NES trust battery was first posed (with some very slight variation in the phrasing of the interest and crooked questions) in the
143
1958 post-congressional election survey.
The trust and interest
questions reappeared in the 1964 survey and have been asked in
nearly every survey since (the trust question has been asked in every
144
survey since 1964). John Alford thus argues that the key measure in
145
the NES is the trust question.
The NES trust question data show
that people saying they trust government in Washington most or all
of the time increased from 1958 to 1964, then decreased from nearly
146
80% in 1964 to just below 70% in 1966. There was a further steady
drop to around 55% in 1970, a leveling off in 1972, then a steep drop

141
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144
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I borrow this way of listing the questions from Marc Hetherington. See MARC J.
HETHERINGTON, WHY TRUST MATTERS: DECLINING POLITICAL TRUST AND THE DEMISE OF
AMERICAN LIBERALISM 14 (2005).
Id.
The survey is available at the NES website, ftp://ftp.electionstudies.org/ftp/
nes/studypages/1958post/pstq1958.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).
See John R. Alford, We’re All in this Together: The Decline of Trust in Government, 1958–1996,
in WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE? 28, 29–30 (John R. Hibbing
& Elizabeth Theiss-Morse eds., 2001) [hereinafter AMERICANS DISLIKE?].
Id.
Id. at 31.
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to less than 40% in 1974.
The most or all of the time score bot148
tomed out in 1980 at less than 30%.
Trust then rose, peaking at
149
over 40% in 1984 and leveling off. But there was a further drop to
less than 30% in 1990 and a new low of near 20% in 1994, before a
150
small increase to over 30% in 1996.
The shocking terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 did not lead
to a permanent reversal of this decades-long decline in trust. As Marc
Hetherington explains, trust in government went up after 9/11, but it
151
also eroded quickly. “In June 2002, with the September 11 attacks
nine months in the past, trust in government dropped to the same
152
level recorded in the 2000 NES.”
After 9/11 trust in government
153
increased, but only to Clinton-era levels. Not exactly a return to the
1960s.
Social scientists have analyzed and debated the reasons for the decline and subsequent minor recovery in levels of trust. What they
have not done very often is ask why the trust Americans had in the
federal government has never returned to the levels enjoyed in the
early and mid-1960s. In addition, they have not focused with sufficient precision on the decline that occurred from 1964 to 1966. The
NES shows trust actually increased from 1958 to 1964. Why did the
decline begin after 1964, a well-known period of great executivelegislative partnership and accomplishment?
The high tide of President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society was
the passage of the Voting Rights Act in August 1965. Yet this appears
to be the point at which Americans began to lose confidence in the
performance of the federal government. Further, Americans apparently feel that no matter what the government has done since, no
matter who is in charge, no matter what policies are enacted, nothing
has merited a fundamental change in their lack of trust in government. Is the record of government since 1965 really this bad? Are we
looking at forty years of unremitting failure?
Perhaps there are reasons for so thinking. But such a permanent
decline in a key indicator is arguably a clue about the nature of the
constitutional order that took hold in the 1960s and continues today.
It has been argued persuasively that the decline of trust does not im147
148
149
150
151
152
153

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See HETHERINGTON, supra note 141, at 30–33.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 35.
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plicate the legitimacy of fundamental constitutional institutions.
There is no evidence that the public disapproves of the Constitution,
important constitutional concepts such as the separation of powers,
or wishes any constitutional institution abolished or changed significantly. However, a persistent lack of trust can still be regarded as significant from a constitutional perspective. The public may still believe in the Constitution, but relentless distrust puts government, in
effect, on a starvation diet in terms of the public authority it needs to
155
operate effectively.
We therefore need to examine the kind of constitutional order
that existed in the early 1960s and ask whether existing explanations
for the initial decline in trust are adequate. If they are not, we should
go further and inquire whether an explanation might be developed
that would fit the circumstances of the decline more closely.
C. The 1960s and the Permanent Decline of Political Trust
A number of scholars cite Vietnam as the explanation for the initial decline in trust shown in the 1966 NES. In their helpful review of
the literature, Margaret Levi and Laura Stoker comment that “the
decline in trust from the 1960s to the 1970s was fueled by citizens’ reactions to the war in Vietnam, Watergate, and civil rights initia156
tives.” Joseph Nye argues that it is unlikely that the initial decline of
trust in the 1960s was related to poor economic performance. Dur157
ing this period, economic growth was generally strong.
Vietnam
and Watergate, he says, help explain how the decline began, but not
158
why it is still going on.
Of course, these are general observations.
Watergate did not occupy the attention of the American public until
1973. Vietnam and civil rights fit the timeline more precisely, but
there are some problems, as I will discuss below.
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See id. at 14–15; see also Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & Philip D. Zelikow, Conclusion: Reflections, Conjectures, and Puzzles, in WHY PEOPLE DON’T TRUST GOVERNMENT, supra note 125, at 253,
277.
See JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY: AMERICANS’
BELIEFS ABOUT HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK 210–11 (2002).
Margaret Levi & Laura Stoker, Political Trust and Trustworthiness, 3 ANN. REV. POL. SCI.
475, 480–81 (2000).
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Introduction: The Decline of Confidence in Government to WHY PEOPLE
DON’T TRUST GOVERNMENT, supra note 125, at 1, 10–11.
Id. at 15.
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Nye and Philip Zelikow have made some valuable observations
about the nature of the explanation that has to be provided for the
159
decline of trust in government. The explanation has to fit the timing and onset of the decline. They believe that Vietnam and Water160
gate work quite well explaining the onset of the decline.
But Nye
and Zelikow are somewhat careless here. As we have seen, there is a
significant decline in trust from 1964 to 1966. But this is prior to the
period in which Vietnam becomes a nationally contentious issue.
161
Although Vietnam and Watergate were precipitating events, Nye
and Zelikow argue that there were deeper causes. One was a transformation in the nature of the economy, which they summarize as the
162
“Third Industrial Revolution.” There was a developing sense of the
dangers of globalization and a loss of control over the economy as a
163
whole.
The second was a change in social-cultural attitudes, stemming from government intervention in social relations, such as civil
164
rights and gender relations. There were also negative effects from
165
media reporting about government. They summarize:
The short form of this story is that historical events in the 1960s and
early 1970s (Vietnam and Watergate) precipitated a drop in confidence
in the U.S. government, but the effects (as well as the cross-national analogues) have been broader and long-lasting because of (1) long-term
secular changes in sociocultural attitudes toward authority and traditional social order that came to a head in the 1960s; (2) profound economic changes caused by the information revolution and globalization;
(3) changes in the political process that increased the distance between
the political activists and the public; and (4) a more consistently negative
approach by the press to government and other institutions. Together,
166
these changes have reinforced a popular culture of bad government.

In an insightful article, John Alford has argued that we need bet167
ter explanations why the decline in trust occurred. The decline occurred across all political institutions and all lines of party, ideology,
168
race, income, and region.
Institution-specific and policy-specific
169
explanations are inadequate to explain the decline. He comments:

159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169

See Nye & Zelikow, supra note 154, at 253.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 270.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 275–76.
Alford, supra note 144, at 42.
Id.
Id.
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[M]y argument here is that it is time to take the details of the actual
trends in trust seriously and to stop asserting that we all know why trust in
government declined in the sixties and seventies when in fact we have no
explanation that is compatible with the details of what we know about the
170
decline itself.

Alford notes that there was no rise in general cynicism in the pe171
riod in question.
Perhaps distrust of government is the public’s
172
“natural state.” This hypothesis would shift the focus to asking why
trust in government increased, presumably during the 1950s or perhaps earlier. Alford answers by posing a broad historical explanation.
An external threat to the country could cause citizens to rally around
173
the government. He notes that:
In 1960 over 60% of the respondents cite foreign policy or defense as the
number one problem [facing the nation]. By 1974 this has fallen into
single digits and remains there through 1978. Likewise, trust in govern174
ment takes its dramatic plunge over this same period.

The 1950s and early 1960s, the height of the Cold War, could plausibly be characterized as a period in which Americans perceived an external threat from the Soviet Union and China. Perhaps this was an
unusual period during which foreign policy and defense matters took
precedence over the normal dominance of domestic issues. But why
would a return to domestic issues lead to a decline in trust?
These observations are helpful, if somewhat preliminary. But
even these astute scholars do not focus with sufficient care on the
1964–66 period. Why does the decline in trust start here? Vietnam
will not work as an explanation. There is no evidence of general pub175
lic opposition to the war during 1966, the key year in question. The
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (arguably) authorizing the Vietnam War
occurred in August 1964 and President Johnson’s fateful decision to
escalate the war into a major commitment did not come until July
176
1965. The famous hearings held by Senator William Fulbright criticizing the premises of the war were held in January 1966, but did not
177
presage any fundamental shift in public opinion. There was a nega170
171
172
173
174
175
176

177

Id. at 42–43.
Id. at 44.
Id.
Id. at 45.
Id.
JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945–1974, at 598, 629
(1996).
See id. at 602–03, 613–14 (detailing America’s escalating involvement in Vietnam during
Johnson’s presidency). On the July 1965 decisions, see GEORGE C. HERRING, AMERICA’S
LONGEST WAR: THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM, 1950–1975, at 152–57 (1996).
PATTERSON, supra note 175, at 598.
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tive shift in public opinion in 1967, but as late as mid-1967, a major179
ity of the public still supported the war.
Was this period one in which the government was perceived as doing nothing about important national problems? Of course the opposite is the case. The period in question begins with LBJ’s overwhelming electoral victory over Republican candidate Senator Barry
Goldwater. Johnson had already swung into action during the summer of 1964 by winning passage of a tax cut, the war on poverty, and
180
the Civil Rights Act. Johnson followed up his electoral victory with
one of the most productive sessions of Congress in history, winning
passage of federal aid to education, Medicare and Medicaid, immigration reform, and the Voting Rights Act, as well as various pollution
181
control and natural resources measures.
Perhaps LBJ and the Democratic Congress were wrong to think
that all this liberal activism was what the public wanted. Yet with one
important exception, there is no evidence that these measures were
unpopular. Certainly they were not repealed in forthcoming decades
and, indeed, the scope of many of these policy initiatives was extended. The exception is civil rights legislation. If we cast around for
a group that was dissatisfied with the course of national policy in this
period, it appears Southern whites might qualify. They were the
group, after all, whose preferences concerning racial policy were consistently defeated. Marc Hetherington notes: “From 1964 to 1970,
when the reach of civil rights legislation was largely confined to the
South, southerners were less trustful of the federal government than
182
nonsoutherners, although the gap had begun to close by 1968.”
Perhaps the initial decline in trust was led by whites uncomfortable
with the speed at which the United States was moving into a new era
of race relations.
There is historical evidence to support the idea of a white backlash that began during the 1964–66 period. As President Johnson
and Congress busied themselves passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Alabama Governor George Wallace was shocking liberals with his ap183
parent appeal to voters in such northern states as Wisconsin. Wallace won particular approval among northern whites for his attacks

178
179
180
181
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183

HERRING, supra note 176, at 190–91.
PATTERSON, supra note 175, at 633.
Id. at 532–47.
Id. at 569.
HETHERINGTON, supra note 141, at 21.
PATTERSON, supra note 175, at 547–48.
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184

on open housing legislation. In this same period, California voters
185
passed Proposition 14, repealing the Rumford Fair Housing Act.
Liberals could not explain the passage of Proposition 14 any more
186
It appears relatively
than they could explain Wallace’s popularity.
clear in hindsight, however, that at least some whites thought antidiscrimination laws were moving too far, too fast. They saw government as taking an aggressive position favoring the rights of blacks
over whites, rather than establishing equal justice for all. Whites
might also have viewed the August 1965 Watts Riot in Los Angeles as
evidence that government was failing in its basic responsibility to
187
maintain order.
So it is likely that not everyone was happy with the course of national policymaking from 1964 to 1966. Some whites might have begun to express less trust toward the national government because of
the change in racial policy. But while these reactionary views may
help explain the initial decline in trust in government, they do not
explain its long duration. Both racial policies and views have evolved
since the mid-1960s, yet trust in government remains low. What is
required is an account that would help explain both why trust declined in the initial 1964–66 period, and also why it did not recover
the substantial ground lost during the 1964–80 period. We need to
maintain a dual focus on both the key initial period of 1964–66 and
the subsequent fact that trust never returned to the levels enjoyed in
the early 1960s.
In developing such an explanation, I believe Alford is right to
frame the inquiry in historical terms. The NES data suggest that the
nation moved from a high-trust to a low-trust era within a short span
of time. Further, the initial decline in trust and subsequent duration
of the decline cannot be explained through an appeal to discrete factors such as unpopular wars or political scandals. Something else
shifted in the background of American politics that created the conditions for a long-term decline in political trust. I suggest that atten-

184
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186
187

DAN T. CARTER, THE POLITICS OF RAGE: GEORGE WALLACE, THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW
CONSERVATISM, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 207 (1995).
See MATTHEW DALLEK, THE RIGHT MOMENT: RONALD REAGAN’S FIRST VICTORY AND THE
DECISIVE TURNING POINT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 46–61 (2000) (narrating the account of
passage of Rumford law and subsequent repeal by Proposition 14). Proposition 14 was
overturned by the Supreme Court in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
See DALLEK, supra note 185, at 60.
See PATTERSON, supra note 175, at 448–49 (giving several examples of the social unrest in
the 1960s, including the Watts riot).

580

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 11:3

tion should be paid to shifts in the nature of the political and constitutional order.
D. The Constitutional Order and the Decline of Political Trust
My argument is that the decline of political trust is in part the result of a mismatch between public expectations rooted in the Constitution itself and what the political system can provide. Trust in government was likely high during the 1940s (although empirical
evidence is slim) and 1950s, but this period of strong civic belief was
in a sense artificial. It was being produced by the consensus behind
World War II and the Cold War. Once the Cold War began to ebb
after 1963, conditions were ripe for a return to “normal” politics.
Unfortunately, this return occurred in a period of extraordinary domestic political conflict. Because the American public does not favor
188
a politics ridden with conflict, trust in government began to decline. Further, trust stayed low, relative to the levels attained in the
1950s and early 1960s, because it became apparent that conflict was
189
the normal condition of domestic politics.
It may be the case that a lack of trust in government is the “natural” condition of the American polity and that the period of high
trust and confidence in government in the middle of the twentieth
century was therefore anomalous. While I think there is some truth
in this, the crucial point, the constitutional point, is that low trust can
lead to instability in a constitutional order characterized by activist
government. To put the point another way, low trust is nonfunctional for an activist constitutional order. In such an order, low trust
does not lead to a restoration of limited government. It leads rather
to bad government and poor policy.
There are some similarities between this argument and a recent
thesis about the decline of liberalism made by historian H.W.
190
Brands. By “liberalism,” Brands means, roughly, the belief that big
government can solve social problems. Brands argues that “the liberalism that characterized the period from 1945 until the early 1970s
was anomalous by the standards of American history. Moreover, this
anomaly was chiefly the consequence of the predominant feature of
188

189
190

See the discussion in ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION, AFTER ALL: WHAT MIDDLE-CLASS
AMERICANS REALLY THINK ABOUT:
GOD, COUNTRY, FAMILY, RACISM, WELFARE,
IMMIGRATION, HOMOSEXUALITY, WORK, THE RIGHT, THE LEFT, AND EACH OTHER 285–86
(1998).
I sketched an argument similar to this one in GRIFFIN, supra note 21, at 194–201.
H.W. BRANDS, THE STRANGE DEATH OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM (2001).
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191

global politics at the time—the Cold War.”
During World War II
and the Cold War, Americans put their traditional distrust of gov192
ernment to one side.
The Cold War, especially in its first decade,
was perceived as a real war, and in wartime, the American people
193
rally around the national government. From Brands’s perspective,
the decline in trust was triggered by Vietnam. High levels of trust in
government were an artifact of the Cold War and “when the Cold
War cracked up in Vietnam, it shattered the consensus, ravaged
popular faith in government, and scorched the earth from which the
194
liberal agenda had sprung.”
Brands’s account is valuable in emphasizing the role of World War
II and the Cold War in creating the conditions that led to increased
trust in government. A number of scholars agree that World War II
sparked high levels of trust in government. Robert Putnam points to
195
the special nature of the national experience during World War II.
There was an “extraordinary burst of civic activity” during and after
196
the war because it involved “shared adversity and a shared enemy.”
Richard Neustadt contends that trust was high during World War II
197
and in the postwar years.
While I do not agree that Vietnam was the key event that triggered
198
the loss of trust in government, Brands does provide a clue about
the crucial transition period of 1964–66. He notes that the Cold War
199
reached a new pitch of intensity with the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.
After the crisis, both sides took steps to defuse tensions and this led to
a perception, among liberals at least, that the Cold War had changed
200
and that domestic issues could assume a new priority.
It is likely,
then, that as the initial period of decline began after 1964, the Cold

191
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Id. at x.
Id. at x–xi, 47.
See id. at 65–66 (noting the general acceptance of a big federal bureaucracy during the
Cold War).
Id. at 125.
PUTNAM, supra note 120, at 268–72.
Id. at 268.
Richard E. Neustadt, The Politics of Mistrust, in WHY PEOPLE DON’T TRUST GOVERNMENT,
supra note 125, at 179, 191.
In general, Brands weakens his argument by not taking into consideration the NES and
other survey evidence. He presents President Reagan as presiding over a further decline
in trust, when the Reagan years were one of the few periods in which trust increased.
BRANDS, supra note 190, at 140, 150–51.
See id. at 83 (describing the crisis as “the most terrifying hundred hours in the history of
the Cold War”).
See ALLEN J. MATUSOW, THE UNRAVELING OF AMERICA: A HISTORY OF LIBERALISM IN THE
1960S, at 377 (1984).
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War was no longer delivering the same measure of support for the
government’s actions.
In many respects, Marc Hetherington’s detailed study of political
trust supports my argument. Hetherington explains the decline of
201
activist government in terms of the decline of trust in government.
He uses the NES and other data to show that “declining political trust
has played the central role in the demise of progressive public policy
202
in the United States over the last several decades.”
Hetherington
discounts the role of ideological change, contending little evidence
203
exists that there has been a conservative turn in public opinion.
When Americans actually benefit from government programs, they
204
support them. But people need to trust the national government in
order for that government to undertake the sort of programs that
benefit minorities by using taxes and benefits drawn from majorities,
205
such as antipoverty and race-targeted programs.
Hetherington
comments, “While the early to middle 1960s were perhaps anomalous
in their high levels of public trust, they allowed policymakers great
leeway in proposing and implementing federal solutions to America’s
206
problems.”
A proactive government able to address policy problems as they
arise must be underwritten by the authority granted by public trust in
government. This trust might be thought of as a willingness to grant
the benefit of the doubt. Roughly since the mid-1970s, the American
public has been unwilling to grant that benefit, thus placing a sort of
invisible limit on the ability of government to act.
Why would a renewed emphasis on domestic issues result in a
permanent decline in trust? Here we should turn to two pathbreaking studies on the “process preferences” of Americans done by John
207
Their approach is unusual
Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse.
and valuable in that they focus on how Americans want public business done, rather than asking about their policy preferences. This

201
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204
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See HETHERINGTON, supra note 141.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 38, 45–46.
Id. at 42–43.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 8.
See JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, CONGRESS AS PUBLIC ENEMY: PUBLIC
ATTITUDES TOWARD AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS (1995) [hereinafter HIBBING &
THEISS-MORSE, CONGRESS]; HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 155.
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means their studies provide insight into the constitutional prefer208
ences of Americans concerning how politics should be structured.
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse contend that “people’s support for the
political system is influenced at least as much by the processes employed in the political system as by the particular outputs emanating
from the process. Policy is important, but the public’s perceptions of
209
how that policy was arrived at also matters.”
This means that it is
possible for trust in government to be influenced by how government
operates. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse’s results suggest that trust is low
because Americans do not like the normal processes of democratic
government. As they put it:
Americans tend to dislike virtually all . . . democratic processes . . . . They
dislike compromise and bargaining, they dislike committees and bureaucracy, they dislike political parties and interest groups, they dislike
big salaries and big staffs, they dislike slowness and multiple stages, and
they dislike debate and publicly hashing things out, referring to such ac210
tions as haggling or bickering.

In short, Americans do not like political conflict. Hibbing and
Theiss-Morse’s first study was of Congress, often thought of as the
most democratic, representative, and responsive branch of government. But the study participants did not see it that way. It is well
known that Americans tend to have negative views of Congress in
211
general even as they have positive views of their own representative.
Care must be taken in interpreting this result. Americans may in fact
have a positive view of “Congress,” the constitutional institution. But
crucially, they have a poor opinion of members of Congress when
212
they act collectively.
Among the three constitutional institutions,
213
Congress is the least approved.
Where does Congress go wrong? Hibbing and Theiss-Morse’s results show that Americans believe that members of Congress have
214
been corrupted by special interests. Americans tend not to identify
with special interests, whether of the left or right. Instead, they see
interest groups as the favored clients of the Washington “insider” sys-

208

209
210
211
212
213
214

In employing their results, my assumption is that it is plausible that their results, obtained
from surveys done in the 1990s, have something to tell us about the reaction of Americans to the events of the mid-1960s. That is, it is reasonable to assume that the process
preferences of Americans have remained relatively stable over time.
HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, CONGRESS, supra note 207, at 14.
Id. at 18 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 43.
Id. at 44–45.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 62–63.
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215

tem of politics.
The public hates the very idea of insiders. “It reminds them of their own outsider status and it opens the possibility
that benefits will be distributed in something other than a just and
216
equitable fashion.”
From the perspective of constitutional history,
there is a tinge of Jacksonian political values here. It is also appropriate to note an echo of the themes present in late nineteenth century
California politics.
The broader picture is that Congress is the most detested branch
217
because it is the most visible branch. But what is visible is the standard legislative politics of conflict and debate, followed by compromise and logrolling. The public loathes each and every element of
218
this normal democratic process.
People who have more political
knowledge are more likely to be tolerant of debate and compromise.
But even Americans who are relatively expert about politics detest po219
litical professionalization and interest groups. Hibbing and TheissMorse conclude that “[a] surprising number of people, it seems, dislike being exposed to processes endemic to democratic govern220
ment.” Americans appear to be convinced “that we can have a democracy without uncertainty, conflicting options, confusion,
221
bargaining, or compromises for solutions.”
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse followed up their study of Congress
222
with a study of American attitudes toward government in general.
They contend Americans want “stealth democracy,” an efficient de223
Their
mocracy that does not require their active participation.
study shows that while people do not generally want to be active in
government, they do want it to be available, accountable, and open
224
when they do wish to become involved.
However, normally what
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Id. at 64–65.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 57–58.
Id. at 61, 125.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 155.
HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 155. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse conducted two surveys to support this second study, one national survey in Spring 1998 of 1,266 voting-age
Americans, and eight focus groups across in the United States in the same year. Id. at 26–
27.
Id. at 2.
Id. This approach toward democracy might sound familiar to constitutional theorists who
have absorbed Bruce Ackerman’s idea of dual democracy. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) (developing the distinction between “higher lawmaking,”
which occurs only rarely and is done in the name of the people, and “normal lawmaking,”
which happens every day through the government).
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people want from government is consensus, unity of purpose, and a
lack of concern for special interests, not accountability and respon225
siveness. “The processes people really want would not be provided
by the populist reform agenda they often embrace; it would be provided by a stealth democratic arrangement in which decisions are
made by neutral decision makers who do not require sustained input
226
from the people in order to function.”
With respect to trust in government, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse
propose that it is driven more by perceptions of process than by policy outcomes. After all, studies have shown that voters are usually interested in just a few issues and people do not have a well-developed
227
set of policy preferences. Further, policy outcomes do not seem to
228
In the 1990s, for examexplain variances in trust in government.
ple, “victory in the Cold War and the incredibly strong economy from
late 1992 to mid-1997 brought some of the worst marks for dissatisfaction with government since the beginning of systematic public opin229
ion data.”
Nearly 70% of the respondents in the 1998 Hibbing and TheissMorse survey felt that the political system was not responsive to their
230
This was despite the fact that most Americans perceive
interests.
government policies to be moderate, in line with their own prefer231
ences. Nonetheless, “[m]any people who have no particular problem with the policies produced by the government are tremendously
232
dissatisfied with that government.” Dissatisfaction with government
is thus not based on policy disputes, but rather on how the process of
government works.
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse argue that the low opinion Americans
have of democratic processes is driven by the misperception that
their policy interests and preferences are similar to the majority of
Americans. The public believes there is a consensus on public policy,
but a flawed process in Washington is frustrating the true interests of
233
the people. People believe that “special interests and their cronies
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HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 155, at 4.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 21–22, 150.
Id. at 25, 63–64.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 38.
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in the political parties and in government have commandeered the
234
entire process.”
More positively, what Americans want from the political process is
to have decisions made unselfishly, without influence from special in235
terests. The American people want policymaking elites to be disin236
terested and not self-serving. So if it were possible to have govern237
ment “by non-self-interested elites,” Americans would readily accept
this alternative.
In light of these process preferences, it will not be surprising to
legal scholars that in the 1998 survey done by Hibbing and TheissMorse, the Supreme Court was the most popular institution of gov238
ernment. Americans are well disposed toward government institutions as a whole, but they tend to dislike Congress and the federal
government the most, the Supreme Court and state governments the
239
least. True, Americans do not want major changes in our system of
government, but they define “major” in a different way from political
elites. “Major” would be throwing democracy overboard for authoritarian government. On this conception, the banning of all interest
groups would not count as a major change and many Americans find
240
the idea of such a ban attractive.
The general picture that emerges from the Hibbing and TheissMorse studies is of an American public that wants government by
consensus and dislikes political conflict of any kind. Hibbing and
Theiss-Morse contend that Americans falsely believe that there is a
consensus on the policy goals the country should have and the means
241
to achieve them. “Consequently, when it is apparent that the political arena is filled with intense policy disagreement, people conclude
that the reason must be illegitimate—namely, the influence of special
242
interests.” The belief in a false consensus must be stated carefully,
243
however. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse note that “[t]he false consensus that really hurts people’s views of the government is not the one
that leads people to believe that everyone shares their policy belief
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Id. at 38.
Id. at 85–86.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 132–33.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 133–34.
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but the one that says everyone shares their lack of concern about
244
most of the issues the government is addressing.” That is, from the
perspective of the average citizen, national politics is full of intense
245
and apparently endless conflict over issues that are unimportant.
No wonder citizens are frustrated with government.
246
“In
Americans thus dislike debate, compromise, and conflict.
fact, people believe the very existence of conflict is a sign that elected
247
officials are out of touch with ordinary Americans.” Large percentages of the public would view favorably governing structures that are
248
not democratic, such as leaving decisions to nonelected experts.
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse call this method of government “stealth
249
democracy.”
“The goal in stealth democracy is for decisions to be
made efficiently, objectively, and without commotion and disagree250
ment.”
The studies by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse raise many interesting
and important questions about American democracy and have clear
implications for the debate over direct democracy. In terms of the
discussion in this part of the Article, I am concerned only with the
implications of their findings for the two aspects of the decline of
trust in government identified earlier: Why did trust begin declining
before the traumas of Vietnam and Watergate, and why was the decline permanent in the sense of never fully regaining the ground
lost?
These studies suggest that trust declined because American politics moved from a regime that was relatively consensual to one that
was riven by conflict. It is not news that the 1950s was a time of consensus in American politics. Certainly American intellectuals thought
so at the time. But historians have also reached this judgment in
251
The sense of consensus had several sources. One was
hindsight.
President Eisenhower’s acceptance of the basic structure of the New
252
Deal, including social security.
Another was Eisenhower’s style of
leadership, “evok[ing] a quiescent mood of stability and consen244
245
246
247
248
249
250
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Id. at 224.
Id. at 221.
See id. at 134–37.
Id. at 142.
See id. at 138–39.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 143.
See, e.g., WILLIAM H. CHAFE, UNFINISHED JOURNEY: AMERICA SINCE WORLD WAR II 185
(1986); BARBARA SINCLAIR, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE U.S. SENATE 52–53 (1989).
JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, THE PROUD DECADES: AMERICA IN WAR AND IN PEACE, 1941–1960,
at 131 (1988).
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253

sus.” Certainly politicians did not hear many complaints about the
254
economy, which was undergoing a period of tremendous growth. If
the 1950s “gave Americans a sense of pride in themselves and confi255
dence in the future,” historians have also noted a change in the national mood at the end of the Eisenhower administration and extending into the early 1960s, one that possibly heralded a new period of
256
activist government. It seems Americans were undergoing a period
of transition, but the shape of the new politics was unclear.
It is worth noting that in substantial measure, the political consensus of the 1950s was artificial. The normal channels of political dissent and protest were smothered by the fear of communism and the
257
politics that fed from this fear, usually called McCarthyism. As “the
most widespread and longest lasting wave of political repression in
258
American history,” McCarthyism had a significant effect on American politics. Any viewpoint that was to the left of the Democratic
party was suspect. Hence, the range of political debate was nar259
rowed. Americans living through this period might have justifiably
acquired the idea, expressed somewhat later by President Kennedy,
that politics was simply a matter of administration, not of fundamental ideological conflict.
To understand this transition within a constitutional framework,
we need to recall the background in which it occurred. The reigning
constitutional order was that of the New Deal. The national government’s assumption of responsibility for regulating the economy during the New Deal had profound implications for American constitutionalism. The activism of the government in addressing the Great
Depression encouraged citizens to look routinely to national politics
260
for solutions to social problems. Once the constitutional barriers to
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Id. at 178–81.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 348–50; see also JOHN MORTON BLUM, YEARS OF DISCORD: AMERICAN POLITICS AND
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See generally ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA (1998)
(assessing the impact of anti-communist sentiments across a variety of events and institutions).
Id. at x.
See id. at 359–95 (showing how anti-communist sentiments suppressed political debate
and diversity of opinion).
See, e.g., BARRY D. KARL, THE UNEASY STATE: THE UNITED STATES FROM 1915 TO 1945, at
226–27 (1983); SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE PRESIDENT AND THE PARTIES:
THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM SINCE THE NEW DEAL 150 (1993).
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the expansion of the national political agenda were removed, there
were no limits on the kind of issues the national state might consider.
Thus, to widen the focus somewhat, the 1960–66 period was a key
moment of transition within the New Deal constitutional order.
There was a growing sense that the boundaries of political change
had been drawn too tightly. McCarthyism and the loyalty security
programs that went with it had ebbed. The perceived external threat
from the Soviet Union lessened after 1963. Americans were ready for
more consensual progress, but instead they encountered a conten261
tious national politics. In the midst of the transition to a politics of
conflict and polarization, Americans began reacting negatively by indicating a lack of trust in government. As political conflict continued
and intensified in the late 1960s, Americans responded by driving
levels of distrust to new lows. The era of permanently low trust in
government had arrived.
In many respects, however, citizens retained a political worldview
characteristic of an earlier constitutional regime. Perhaps there were
some resemblances between what Americans expected from politics
in the 1950s and what they expected in the 1790s. But it is more
likely that the Jacksonian era, with its emphasis on political equality,
combating privilege, and hostility to the “interests,” is the nearest ancestor of the kind of worldview described in the Hibbing and TheissMorse studies. This mismatch between political worldview and the
interest group state established in the New Deal could persist because
of the political consensus behind President Roosevelt’s efforts to fight
the Great Depression and win World War II. Once that consensus
eroded, Americans began to glimpse the real nature of politics in a
state full of interest groups jostling for advantage, lobbyists seeking
influence, polarized single issue organizations, and politicians brokering deals among them all.
The turmoil in American politics after the 1950s suggests that
there is no such thing as a democratic politics of consensus as a normal state of affairs. Thus, when a consensus exists on a wide range of
policy issues in a democracy, it is reasonable to infer that it is being
maintained by an unusual external threat (such as during a war), or
is the result of a constricted political agenda produced by economic,
social, or legal restrictions on political participation. The Cold War
produced a bipartisan consensus in foreign affairs because an external threat was perceived clearly by elites and the public. It also had
261

For a review of the polarization of politics in the 1960s and early 1970s, see PATTERSON,
supra note 175, at 442–57, 547–57, 565–68, 637–77, 706–09, 730–35.
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an important effect in limiting the further extension of the New Deal
domestic policy agenda, as unions and other liberal organizations
262
were forced on the defensive during the era of McCarthyism.
In
addition, the restrictions on the electorate enacted in the Populist263
Progressive eras remained in force. All of these factors maintained
the World War II consensus long after the fighting had ended.
Consider, then, how many roads intersected in the 1960s. The legal restrictions on effective political participation were for the most
part abolished. There was renewed attention to domestic issues in
the context of long-standing grievances by minorities. Consensus disappeared and polarization increased. To put it another way, the
United States experienced full-fledged national democratic politics
for the first time in its history. Americans responded to the political
effects of this tremendous historical achievement with something like
disgust. Not that Americans are opposed to democracy, the right to
vote, or the principles of the civil rights movement. But the Hibbing
and Theiss-Morse studies show that Americans do not understand
that making politics more democratic does not make it more consensual. In fact, the opposite is the case.
III. COMING TO TERMS WITH DIRECT DEMOCRACY
In this final Part, I will discuss direct democracy and “California
constitutionalism” in light of the decline of trust in government. I
hope it is apparent that instead of regarding direct democracy as deviant, it might be more appropriate to ask why it does not exist on a
national level. The answer probably lies with the greater difficulty in
amending the federal Constitution. Nevertheless, the problems with
representative government in California are national problems. Citizens do not have much respect for the legislative process and seek alternatives if they have the chance. For reasons of history at least distantly related to the problems citizens have with contemporary
politics, Californians have been afforded a chance denied to citizens
nationwide.
Again, this is not to deny that direct democracy has serious shortcomings. Before briefly setting forth a number of the more significant criticisms, I hope it is evident why I will not devote attention to
the familiar charge that direct democracy is inconsistent with the

262
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See SCHRECKER, supra note 257.
See EARL BLACK & MERLE BLACK, POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN THE SOUTH 112 (1987).
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Founders’ vision of republican government. This sort of sweeping
criticism ignores the reality that we have allowed extensive formal
constitutional change at the state level to supplement the original designs of the Founding Generation. It also ignores that the latter-day
framers of direct democracy had good reason to conclude that representative government had fallen short and required reform.
As the twentieth century gave way to the twenty-first, it was evident
there were at least three substantial lines of critique against the use of
direct democracy, particularly in the initiative, in California politics.
First, critics argued that rather than create a better form of popular
politics, the initiative had become simply another venue for interest
265
groups to pursue their goals. Interest groups, not voters, seemed to
dominate initiative politics. Second, there were persistent worries
that initiatives tend to work against the interests of minorities, par266
ticularly racial and ethnic minorities.
Divisive and often bitterly
contested initiatives relating to English as an official language
267
(Proposition 63), abolishing affirmative action (Proposition 209),
restricting illegal immigration and its effects (Proposition 187), and
abolishing bilingual education (Proposition 227) lent credence to
268
this idea. Third, critics charged that the initiative led to a defective,
269
indeed self-defeating, system of governance.
While it is not my purpose to defend direct democracy against
these generally sound criticisms, it is worth noting that critics have
had a hard time identifying flaws of direct democracy that are truly
unique in the sense that they identify a clear difference between it
and representative government. After all, undue influence by inter-

264
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267
268
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See, e.g., BRODER, supra note 2.
See, e.g., Todd Donovan & Shaun Bowler, An Overview of Direct Democracy in the American
States, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS, supra note 1, at 1, 12.
Id. at 16–18; see also Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Judicial Review of Initiatives and Referendums in
Which Majorities Vote on Minorities’ Democratic Citizenship, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 399 (1999) (noting that the referendum process tends to work against minorities and suggesting a formula for reviewing such initiatives based on whether they affect the group’s ability to participate in the political process).
For an account of the Proposition 209 campaign, see LYDIA CHÁVEZ, THE COLOR BIND:
CALIFORNIA’S BATTLE TO END AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1998).
See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, The Devastating Impact of the Initiative Process on Latino and Immigrant Communities (UC Davis Research Paper No. 133, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1103607.
See generally SCHRAG, supra note 4. Political scientist Elisabeth Gerber described the governance problem in California: “Voters perceive government as unaccountable so they
pass initiatives to restrict its actions. This constrains government and prevents it from responding to the state’s pressing demands, which further angers voters and provokes them
to pass even more stringent constraints.” Id. at 216 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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est groups is a problem that plagues all legislatures in the United
States. In addition, as John Matsusaka points out, “the fact that narrow interests dominate the initiative process . . . does not necessarily
270
imply that the final outcomes are nonmajoritarian.” Voters are free
271
to reject initiatives sponsored by interest groups and have done so.
They do not often have that chance with respect to legislative measures sponsored by the same groups. Careful historical investigation
has revealed that interest group involvement with initiatives is noth272
ing new and has been present almost from the beginning.
With respect to minority interests, while I do not wish in any way
to minimize the real concerns behind this criticism, I note that as a
general matter, it would be difficult to show that direct democracy
has a record worse than the ample examples of violations of rights by
elected officials. For example, Jim Crow laws segregating African
273
There is some eviAmericans were passed by state legislatures.
dence that minority voters in California support the institutions of di274
rect democracy.
In response to these and other criticisms, there is no shortage of
275
proposals for reform of direct democracy, especially the initiative.
Whatever the right mix of reforms of direct democracy and the legislative process, I hope I have shown that they must be considered together. What is probably required is not tinkering, but major constitutional reform.
On the other side, how might legislatures be reformed? The survey research on Congress reviewed in Part II suggests in general that
legislators must come to grips with the reality that they are always on
276
trial as far as ordinary citizens are concerned.
Political scientists
David Brady and Sean Theriault have argued that the public has little
tolerance for rules that allow legislators to escape accountability for
taking positions on difficult issues or the consistent use of hyperbolic
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MATSUSAKA, supra note 1, at 12.
See GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 195 (“It is apparently much easier to persuade voters to vote
against a controversial idea than it is to make them endorse it.”).
See David McCuan et al., California’s Political Warriors: Campaign Professionals and the Initiative Process, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS, supra note 1, at 55; see also GOEBEL, supra note 3,
at 193–97.
Id. at 91–93.
MATSUSAKA, supra note 1, at 117–18.
See, e.g., Garrett & McCubbins, supra note 1; see also Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct
Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA
L. REV. 1141 (2003).
See HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 155, at 198.
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and meaningless rhetoric in legislative debates.
In addition, the
common practice of running for Congress by bashing the institution
278
can only have negative consequences for trust.
Finally, the media
tends to magnify the role of the most extreme (and least effective)
279
members of Congress. The public absorbs what it is being told, but
the picture that develops is not one that helps support the institution.
The conclusions reached by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse in their
study of the public’s preference for “stealth democracy” are more
280
counterintuitive. They suggest the legislative process should be less
281
transparent, as in less televised and subject to sunshine laws.
Apparently more transparency leads to greater distrust. They argue on
the basis of their survey that people prefer rule by the people themselves (direct democracy) or non-self-interested nonelected elites
(such as the Supreme Court and Federal Reserve Board) to rule by
282
To change the public’s overwhelmingly negative opinlegislators.
ion of legislators, their contacts with and possible benefits from special interest groups must be reduced to a minimum or eliminated
283
(notwithstanding the First Amendment!).
Hibbing and TheissMorse advance what might be termed an “anti-participation” perspective on democracy: “While people are not eager to provide input into
political decisions, they want to know that they could have input into
political decisions if they ever wanted to do so. In fact, they are pas284
sionate about this.”
I have largely bypassed the debate between critics and proponents
of direct democracy in this Article because I believe both sides are
evading a major issue. Direct democracy would not exist had there
not been a serious and unanswered problem with representative government. And it could not have persisted or, indeed, grown in
strength had there not been background conditions, such as declining trust in government coupled with legislative inaction, that let it
flourish. Although critics of direct democracy make occasional gestures toward the flaws of contemporary politics, the depth of genuine
popular dissatisfaction with legislatures is rarely acknowledged or
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See David W. Brady & Sean M. Theriault, A Reassessment of Who’s to Blame: A Positive Case for
the Public Evaluation of Congress, in AMERICANS DISLIKE?, supra note 144, at 175.
Id. at 191–92.
Id. at 192.
See HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 155.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 216–17.
Id. at 219–21.
Id. at 239.
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made a subject of sustained analysis. The key problem of trust in
government remains largely unexplored in the literature about direct
democracy.
There is no road to fundamental reform or abolition of direct
democracy without addressing the flaws and equally problematic record of representative government. When we critique direct democracy, we must also acknowledge and critique the flaws of government
by legislature. In many ways, they are two aspects of the same problem—the lack of trust in government. This will continue to be a major problem for American constitutionalism.
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APPENDIX
Illustrative California Ballot Propositions, Approved 1978–98
PROPOSITION & ICA/
DATE
IS
Proposition 13
June 1978

ICA

Proposition 4
Nov. 1979

ICA

Proposition 62
Nov. 1986
Proposition 63
Nov. 1986
Proposition 98
Nov. 1988

ICA

Proposition 103
Nov. 1988

IS

Proposition 140
Nov. 1990
Proposition 184
Nov. 1994

ICA

Proposition 187
Nov. 1994

IS

Proposition 209
Nov. 1996
Proposition 210
Nov. 1996
Proposition 215
Nov. 1996
Proposition 218
Nov. 1996
Proposition 227
June 1998

ICA

ICA
ICA
IS

IS

IS
IS
ICA
IS

DESCRIPTION

285

MARGIN OF
VICTORY

Property tax reduction and limitation, two-thirds vote for increases
Appropriation limits for state and
local government, return of
revenues
Regulates new and increased
taxes by local governments
English is official state language

65–35%

Minimum level of funding for
public schools and community
colleges
Reductions in auto insurance
rates, elected Insurance Commissioner (partly invalidated by state
court)
Term limits for state officials,
limits on salary and expenses
Sentences for repeat offenders
(“3 strikes”) (identical statute
passed earlier)
Illegal aliens ineligible for public
social and health services and
education (substantially invalidated by federal court)
Ends affirmative action in California
Increases state minimum wage

51–49%

Use of marijuana for medical
purposes
Requires majority voter approval
of local tax and fee increases
286
Ends bilingual education

74–26%

58–42%
73–27%

51–49%

52–48%
72–28%

59–41%

55–45%
61–39%
56–44%
57–43%
61–39%

ICA = Initiative Constitutional Amendment; IS = Initiative Statute

285
286

The source of this data is ALLSWANG, supra note 1.
The legislature passed a more moderate version of this Proposition, but it was vetoed by
Governor Pete Wilson. ALLSWANG, supra note 1, at 232.

